fox-hunting that is bound up with the English plantations of the seventeenth century and the Cartesian dualisms of the Enlightenment. 3 with an income from service that allowed him to lease a smallholding, employ his own servants, and own horses and dogs for hunting. His is a volume shoring up a new order of colonial primogeniture in which he and his family had found a niche, perhaps one reason for its public status as a published document supported by patrons. Indeed, the book's advice to future huntsmen works to maintain class status by establishing as tradition the right to land obtained by conquest. For although possessing greater knowledge of the land and animals, Stringer is clear that his role is to be 'humbly obedient to his master', obedience being 'the duty of every servant'. 4 And should the better hunting choice be thwarted by 'his master', the huntsman should defer, for '[i]t is necessary for a huntsman without all manner of pride to be humble and obliging to all gentlemen, for it is by such that he lives '. 5 This reliance upon and maintenance of a disciplined hierarchy appears throughout a volume where clear boundaries between the human social classes and between human and nonhuman animals are maintained.
While it would of course be absurdly anachronistic to expect an early eighteenth-century huntsman's manual to question the ethics of the proceedings, an ecofeminist and, indeed, animal studies approach would nonetheless ask us to examine how the case for killing animals for diversion and sport is made. And these fields would also ask us to examine the consequences of assuming as natural and fixed power relations that are in fact constructed and arbitrary. Indeed, the project of many post-humanist, ecofeminist, and animal studies scholarsthere are many intersections among these perspectives -is precisely, as Paul Waldau has put it in his recent Animal Studies, an Introduction, to demystify and unseat a tradition of human exceptionalism, 'an exclusivist, human-centered agenda' which 'dominates, reshapes, and destroys so many domains in our more-than-human world'. 6 As we might expect, Stringer's text reflects a clear Cartesian subordination
